Why is it that we have a concept of "free will," and what does it mean?

A very basic observation that we can make within our own subjective experience is that we are able to imagine ourselves at a given future point in time doing one of several or many different things, though the doing of one of them would rule out the doing of the others.

For instance, at this point in time you can imagine five seconds from now your raising your hand and you can imagine your not doing so. In fact, you can imagine your moving your hand in many different directions, though of course not at the same time.

Also, you can remember an action you have engaged in and also imagine several or many other actions you could have engaged in instead.

So although you can imagine several different possible actions that you could take at a given point in time, you know that only one of those actions will be the one that occurs. Under these circumstances, we tend to say that we have "choices," and that we "choose" to act in one particular way out of a large (perhaps an infinite) number of possible things that we could have done.

Prior to the behavior actually occurring, there is a wide range of possible subjective experiences that could occur.

For instance, each of us has had the subjective experience of not knowing what to do, and then of "deciding" what to do, and then of doing it. And we can often say "why" we have done what we have done, giving our "reason" (or "reasons") for having done so, namely, a predicted and hoped-for outcome. At the beginning of that process, we may be unable to predict what we will eventually decide to do. Afterward, we know what we decided, and why. All of this is our own subjective experience, reportable to others, but not possible to be experienced by others (though others will report similar subjective experience of their own, of course), other than any outwardly observable behavior that is the actual doing of what we decided to do (or behavior observed and interpreted by others as some sort of "struggle" to decide).

We also have the experience at times of finding ourselves doing something despite not wanting to. We are unsuccessful at inhibiting reflex behavior (such as the knee-jerk reflex), even though we can also decide to make the same movement very consciously. There seems to be a difference between such behaviors, referred to as "involuntary" vs. "voluntary" (consciously decided-upon).

We also have the experience of finding ourselves doing, or having done, fairly complex things (like getting dressed or driving) while thinking about something else. The body just seems to know what to do and "does it on its own," so to speak, even though we can also decide to do the same things very "consciously." Such behavior (occurring on its own, so to speak) may be called "automatic" or "automatized," as opposed to "deliberate."

So there is a subjective state that we can identify that precedes some, but not all, of the decisions that we make. The word we usually use to label this feeling that sometimes exists to a greater or lesser extent prior to the choosing of a particular act is the feeling of "intention." It is part of our subjective experience.

The "will" concept comes from the situation in which we subjectively experience the feeling of intention, usually accompanied by subjectively experiencing the behavior intended. So "will" is part of one's subjective experience. One has the subjective experience of "consciously deciding" that is, intending, or "willing," to do something, and then the doing of it.

So "will" is an experience within one's subjective experience on a moment-by-moment basis. Therefore, whatever one's beliefs are about that experience are part of the Subjective Model of subjective experience. As an example, I can decide to make a decision rapidly (more automatically, or by flipping a coin) because of knowing (believing) that if I think about it too much I may become hesitant and miss an opportunity. Such believing is the manifesting of beliefs within my Subjective Model about my own "will." Another example of a belief about my own "will" is my belief as to whether a decision will be easy or difficult, a belief about the discomfort or effort that will be required to make my decision, that is, to exercise my "will."

Let us also recognize that although so far I have referred to "will" as an "experience" (of the feeling of "intention"), it could also be looked at as a belief, a prediction that, for instance, my hand is about to move in a predictable way because of something about my current state of mind (that state of "intention"). This is another example of the occasional lack of clear distinction between "experiencing" (for example, "feeling") and "believing," as has been discussed above.

That feeling of intention, as we noted, varies in intensity. This variation in intensity seems analogous to "force" in the Physical Model. Will is described as "weak" versus "strong." The stronger the "will" is, the more likely it will cause something to happen, according to this modeling. If the infant or small child wants to do something really strongly such that he or she makes strong efforts to do it, and if this happens pretty frequently, and especially if the behavior is undesirable such that there are efforts by others to prevent it that have to be overcome, he or she will very likely be labeled "strong willed." This variable characteristic of "will" is sometimes referred to as "will power."

Thus, "will" is perhaps an aspect or varying characteristic of a "motivational state," a state most frequently linguistically modeled in the Subjective Model with the general word "want." "I want to do this thing really badly." "I want to make it happen." "I want to do this because it will be very pleasurable." "I want to do this to stop the pain and suffering." "I want to do this because I believe it is the right thing to do, and I want to do the right thing." "I want to do this because I will feel really good about myself if I do." "I guess I must not have wanted to do it all that strongly, because I gave up pretty easily." "Will" may be regarded as the "strength" of the motivational state, that is, how strongly we want to do something that we have decided to do. And this variability in the strength of intention is referred to as variability in "will power." (And note here the use of the word "power" in the Subjective Model as well as in the Physical Model, though with different meanings.)

We should note that there is a distinction that can be made between "deciding" and "willing." The concept of "decision" does not necessarily include the idea that that process of decision is "deliberate," or the result of "deliberation," because we can also say that we automatically, or even "unconsciously," decided to do something. This variability in the subjective experience of "deciding" is in the intensity of the "intending" feeling, and is most closely associated with the concept of "will."

In summary, "will" is thus a component of subjective experience, about which beliefs can develop, that are a part of one's Subjective Model (remembering that the Subjective Model can also be considered to include subjective experience, so that the "will" itself can be said to exist in the Subjective Model). And it is possible to put those beliefs into words, that is, to develop a linguistic model of that part of the Subjective Model, on our way toward objectivity and increased accuracy of belief, i.e., on our way toward the Objective Model.

Now from within the Physical Model of the Objective Model, however, as we have noted regarding subjective experience in general, by "willing" or "intending," or even for that matter "deciding," we are meaning "whatever exists or is happening in the brain or nervous system that corresponds to, and is necessary for, the individual's doing one thing as opposed to another." A simplified statement would be, "When you decide to do something, or intend to do something, it is your brain that is doing that deciding or intending." And of course the neurologist is looking at the activity in the brain and assuming that it is following the rules of the universe. To do otherwise would be to proclaim that the physical and chemical processes in the brain at times did not obey the rules of the universe, or physical world. So what we are observing within our own subjective experience that we are calling "deciding" (including "intending") is, within the Physical Model, a process that is obeying the rules of the universe, a process that is "determined" by those rules of the universe, or more precisely within the Tripartite Model, Reality.

Let us look at the word "free" in "free will." What is supposed to be free from what? At least as far as the "free will vs. determinism" debate is concerned, the freedom is freedom from being determined by the rules of the universe. The "will" experience is supposed to be free of the necessity to adhere to the rules of the universe. But science makes the assumption that whatever happens happens according to certain rules, and then science seeks to learn what those rules are. Science does not make the assumption that there is lack of "lawfulness" in the universe; if science did, there would be no reason to study any further, since finding such rules is what science is basically about.

(Well, there might still be reason to engage in such study if we thought that most of the time, or some of the time, the rules were being followed, because doing so would increase our odds of making good decisions. And there would be more reason to do such study if we were able at least to designate the circumstances under which we could be confident that the rules were being followed. However, our enthusiasm for trying to understand "everything" would be reduced if we thought that the rules were not always being followed, because understanding those rules is what we mean by understanding, or having accurate beliefs, or models, that allow us to predict.)

The inability of science to explain something is not considered within science to be evidence that some things do not happen according to the rules of the universe. The explanation of this inability to explain would have to do with the complexity of that which is being studied and/or the inaccessibility of needed data, and/or incomplete understanding of the rules of the universe (frontier of knowledge).

Remember that a model is a model only to the extent that it allows predictions about that which it is modeling, and prediction is only possible if that which is being predicted is occurring according to rules. To be predictable means to follow rules. (Remember that the word "rule" can be used in at least two different ways: a "rule" can simply be a description of what always happens or tends to happen, or it can be a description of what one should do. We are using the first meaning here.)

The Subjective Model includes beliefs about the rules of subjective experience, that is, what can reliably be expected to occur next within our subjective experience, given the current subjective experience. But our subjective experience is replete with lack of predictability. We very frequently don't know what is going to happen, and that fact is accepted by us all. So there is no assumption or expectation that everything we subjectively experience is going to occur according to rules, only certain things, things that have already demonstrated that they are probably predictable. The Subjective Model only models that which has seemed to be predictable.

The Objective Model, on the other hand, is a model of the rules of the universe, or Reality, the universe independent of our perceptions of and beliefs about the universe, that is, independent of the Subjective Model. And science is the epitome of the development of the Objective Model, and makes the assumption that everything is following the rules of the universe, even if we don't know what those rules are.

Now it is true that science has concluded that parts of Reality act according to "chance," which means lack of predictability. But, as described above, that lack of predictability is lawful and predictable. One cannot predict the single event, but can predict the results of measuring a set of events involving the same kind of situation, such that a probability curve, a mathematical description (or model), is produced, and is presumed to be a model of some part of Reality. What is found upon experimentation or natural observation is that the results of multiple measurements when plotted form a predictable distribution curve. The observation of events occurring according to "chance" is in no way supportive of the idea that the rules of the universe are not always followed. The rules of the universe can indeed be modeled such as to produce the prediction that the results of certain experiments (measurements) will be consistent with the rules involved in things happening "by chance."

So we can see that the concept of "free will" does not belong in the Objective Model. "Will" is a subjective experience, within the Subjective Model, about which we can indeed have beliefs within the Subjective Model. And those beliefs within the Subjective Model, involving potential or actual prediction, may involve predictions as to what will happen when we do something, and even a belief that the feeling of intention will be followed by the intended act, but there is almost never a prediction as to the feeling of intention, or "will," itself. The feeling of intention itself is not believed, within the Subjective Model, to be something predictable, and as therefore always following some rules. It is just subjective experience. The Objective Model, on the other hand, is a model of the rules of the universe, of "Reality," that is, what exists independently of our experience of it or beliefs about it, and is assumed to be determined by those rules of the universe.

Let us go back to the Subjective Model (not the Mental Model, which is a sub-model of the Objective Model).

Now when we model, within the Subjective Model, this subjective experience that we call "decision-making" or "intention" or "will," we will develop language in behalf of this modeling. Let us look at some of the characteristics of that language.

Note that some words used in the Subjective Model related to the concept of "will," such as "strong" and "weak" and "power," used also in the Physical Model in relationship to "force," promote the impression that this concept of "will" fits easily into the Physical Model, and therefore into the Objective Model. When such thinking occurs, it produces the impression of a "physical world" in which a person is pushing back with his or her "will" against the rules of the universe, and thereby forcefully becoming "free" of those rules. Once again, introducing "entities" from subjective experience into the Physical Model, producing the Physico-Mental Model, results in a breakdown in modeling, at least if substantial demands are placed on the model, meaning that the Model is used in decision-making. And indeed I think this happens, with very significant negative results, as discussed later.

So what we have so far seen is that "intention," or "decision-making," or "choosing," or "willing" is a perfectly natural and normal and appropriate part of the Subjective Model, as part of situations that we experience, but that the concept of "free will" has no place in the Physical Model, the sub-model of the Objective Model of the "physical world."

But we still have that more difficult to describe situation produced by the Mental Model, the sub-model of the Objective Model of the "mental world."

Once again, using the Objective Model of the mental world, we most appropriately would say that the true meaning of "will" is whatever it is that is happening in the brain that corresponds to the subjective experience of making a decision. All of that initial uncertainty about what the decision will be, along with motivational states leading to wanting to do perhaps opposite things, and then the perceived act of choosing, and the recognition of the reasons for having done so--all of that is simply the action of the neurons in the brain according to the rules of the universe, whether we ever discover those rules completely or not. And yet once again we can simplify and study "decision-making," correlating reports of the subjective experience of decision-making (or other behaviors indicative of decision-making) either with reports of other "entities" in the mental world (such as beliefs) or with "entities" in the physical world (such as hormones, neurotransmitters, and imaged activities of parts of the brain).

If we correlate reports of decision-making (or other behavioral evidence of such decision-making) with things that are happening in the brain, we are using the Physical Model, and if we correlate such evidence of decision-making with reports of thoughts and feelings, we are using the Mental Model, both such models being a part of the Objective Model. We are talking about the same events in Reality (that which exists independently of our modeling of it), but are describing it with different models.

And remember that in the Mental Model, a sub-model within the Objective Model, "entities" such as "feelings" and "thoughts" are modeling shorthand for "whatever is occurring in the brain that corresponds to those processes." (It is easier to use the single word, rather than the whole phrase.) So such entities as "feelings" and "thoughts" in the Mental Model are created by definition, using the same words as are used within the Subjective Model. And the images used to do that modeling, to correspond to those words, are the subjective experiences that we have that we have learned to label with those words.

The Mental Model is an effort to arrive at modeling that allows for as accurate prediction as possible. Thus, when studying "thoughts" and "feelings," we are attempting to develop a model of "Reality" that enables us to predict as accurately as possible. For instance, we say that when people "feel" a particular way, we can predict an increased likelihood that they will act in certain ways, in accordance with the rules of the universe having to do with brain function. And one of the ways that we can say people "feel" is the "feeling" of "intention" or "will."

Although it initially may have seemed that either "free will" or "determinism" is true, but not both, we can now see that both are valuable ways of modeling something about human experience and behavior. "Will" is an experience within subjective experience, and it can be talked about, including one's beliefs about it (within the Subjective Model), by linguistic modeling of that aspect of the Subjective Model. But we can also study that experience within the Mental Model of the Objective Model, learning what things reports of it are correlated with, what the reported experiencing of it is likely to be under certain circumstances, etc. And we can study it by studying what is going on in the nervous system when it is reportedly being experienced, using the Physical Model of the Objective Model. It is when we believe we can combine the Subjective Model and the Objective Model into one model, or the Physical Model and the Mental Model into one model (the Physico-Mental Model) that we run into trouble.

And this trouble coming from efforts to integrate two Models is obscured because of the problem we have already described regarding language and the fact that although the models have different languages, they may have the same words in both, those words having different meanings depending upon which Model they are being used in. Because the words are the same, there is a tendency toward lack of awareness that two different Models are being involved. In the Subjective Model, "will" is one's own experience that no one else can have. In the Mental Model, it is shorthand for whatever is going on in the brain when such experience is reported. And the term is simply not going to be found in the Physical Model. (Thus, it is a supernatural concept, found nowhere in the natural sciences.)

So in the Physical Model, we can study the decision-making of the rat, learning increasingly accurately how the nervous system behaves in response to environmental situations (e.g., mazes, stimuli, etc.), whereas in the Mental Model we can study the role of one's religion (not currently a useful entity for the neurophysiologist) on one's decision-making. And in both cases, because we are still within the Objective Model, that decision-making is assumed to occur according to the rules of the universe, because that is the basic assumption of the Objective Model.

It is thus only within the Subjective Model that the concept of "free will" has any place, and there it is descriptive of the subjective experience that we all have at times.

But once again, we must realize that as long as the way we use our modeling actually works (makes life better by virtue of our being able to be more successful), inaccuracies in thinking and language use may not be significant. However, by the same token, if bad things happen because of such inaccuracies, then we need to develop the necessary understanding to correct that incorrect modeling.

So hopefully I have succeeded in describing how the "mind-body problem" and the "free will vs. determinism problem" are really pseudo-problems brought about by insufficient understanding of certain aspects of modeling and linguistics. The problem is brought about primarily by the attempt to integrate two incompatible models into one, either the integration of the Subjective Model with the Objective Model or the integration of the Mental Model with the Physical Model, such attempted integration not being very evident because of the use of the same words, with different meanings, in the two models.

And the "solution" to these problems is our Tripartite Model, involving the Subjective Model, the Objective Model (with its two main sub-Models, the Physical Model and the Mental Model), and Reality, this Tripartite Model being an improvement over the flawed Physico-Mental Model, in which these problems arise.